Med dvema subjektoma

The article examines the part of Badiou's book on Saint Paul, which deals with two figures of the law, two figures of the subject. She reads this two figures of the subject together with Lacan's formula of sexuation from the Seminar XX, Encore. She shows that Badiou who criticizes Lacan claiming that for Lacan female enjoyment has status of unreachable and not of infinite in the true sense of the word, is much closer to Lacan than it looks at first sight. For Lacan there is only one enjoyment which belongs to the order of infinity, however there are two answers to it, two modes of subjectivation.Članek se loteva tistega dela Badioujeve knjige o svetem Pavlu, ki obravnava dve figuri zakona, dve figuri subjekta. Ti dve figuri subjekta, subjekta kot univerzalnega in subjekta kot neskončnega, avtorica bere skupaj z Lacanovimi formulami seksuacije iz Seminarja XX., Se. Avtorica pokaže, da je Badiou, ki Lacana kritizira, češ, da ima pri njem ženski užitek status nedosegljivega, ne pa neskončnega v pravem pomenu besede, mnogo bližje Lacanu kot je to videti na prvi pogled. Za Lacana namreč ne obstajata dva užitka, končni in neksončni, temveč en sam, ki pripada redu neskončnega, nanj pa odgovarjata dva modusa subjektivacije

Seksualno in ontologija

The paper examines the psychoanalytic (Freud, Lacan) displacement of ontology through its concept of sexuality. It thus turns around two principal questions. 1. What exactly is the psychoanalytic theory of sexuality? Everyone seems to know the answer to this, and the matter seems to be clear enough, yet this is far from being really the case, and the question is well worth asking, and being reconsidered. 2. What (if any) are the implications of the psychoanalytic theory of sexuality for ontology and its contemporary theories? Moreover, what are the possible political implications of this psychoanalytic stance in relation to ontology?Prispevek raziskuje psihoanalitično (Freud, Lacan) premestitev ontologije skozi koncept seksualnosti. Pri tem se osredinja na dve temeljni vprašanji. 1. Kaj natanko je psihoanalitična teorija seksualnega? Zdi se, da vsi poznamo odgovor na to vprašanje, da so zadeve v tem pogledu jasne. Pa vendar še zdaleč ni tako, in zgornje vprašanje je vredno postaviti ter ponovno premisliti. 2. Kakšne so (če obstajajo) implikacije psihoanalitične teorije seksualnega za ontologijo in njene sodobne teorije? In podvprašanje: kakšne so možne politične implikacije psihoanalitičnega stališča v razmerju do ontologije

Ponavljanje

One of the conceptual events that distinguish contemporary post-Hegelian philosophy is the emergence of the concept of repetition as an independent and crucial concept. For Marx, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Freud and, later on, Lacan and Deleuze, the conceptual stakes of repetition are very much at the center of their projects. There are important differences between these projects, but what they all share is that repetition is viewed, posited, and elaborated as fundamentally different from the logic of representation. The paper starts with a brief overview of Marx’s reflections on repetition in relationship to revolution (from The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte), and then focuses mainly on Deleuze and Lacan, on the similarities and differences of their conceptualizations. For Deleuze, repetition as existing beyond representation constitutes an emancipatory realization of Being qua difference. For Lacan, repetition constitutes the other side of representation and cannot be completely separated form it, in spite of their radical heterogeneity. It is related to the contingency involved in the very constitution of the subject. From this perspective the paper then concludes with an analysis of the link between repetition and comedy.Eden izmed konceptualnih dogodkov, ki zaznamujejo sodobno post-heglovsko filozofijo, je vznik koncepta ponavljanja kot samostojnega in ključnega pojma. Marx, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Freud ter kasneje Lacan in Deleuze – konceptualizacija ponavljanja je v osrčju projektov vseh teh mislecev. Med njimi obstajajo pomembne razlike, vsem pa je skupno to, da postavljajo in analizirajo ponavljanje kot v temelju različno od logike reprezentacije. Prispevek začne s kratkim orisom Marxovih razmislekov o ponavljanju v razmerju do revolucije (v spisu »Osemnajsti brumaire Ludvika Bonaparta«), nato pa se ukvarja zlasti z Deleuzeom in Lacanom ter podobnostim in razlikam njune konceptualizacije ponavljanja. Za Deleuzea ponavljanje, kakršno obstaja onstran reprezentacije, tvori emancipatorično realizacijo biti kot razlike. Za Lacana ponavljanje tvori hrbtno stran reprezentacije in ga ni mogoče ločiti od nje, čeprav sta radikalno heterogena. Povezuje ga s kontingenco, ki je na delu pri sami konstituciji subjekta. Iz te perspektive se prispevek v zaključku spusti še v analizo povezave med ponavljanjem in komedijo

Subjekt in univerzalno

The starting point of this paper is Kant’s formulation of the categorical imperative. From the perspective introduced by this starting point, the author analyses the role of the subject in the constitution of the universal law. The first part of the paper deals with the question of subject’s responsibility in what s/he refers to as her/his duty. The second part is dedicated to Kant’s theory of diabolical evil and examines some consequences of Kant’s exclusion of the possibility of diabolical evil.Prispevek izhaja iz nekaterih problemov, kijih postavlja Kantova formulacija kategoričnega imperativa. Od tod poskuša natančneje določiti vlogo subjekta v konstituciji moralnega zakona kot univerzalnega. V prvem delu gre predvsem za vprašanje odgovornosti subjekta pri tem, kar formulira kot svojo dolžnost. V drugem delu paje zadevna problematika postavljena v perspektivo Kantove teorije diaboličnega zla in izključitve le-tega kot nemožnega za človeške akterje

Kant: la loi et ses ricochets

In his Critique of Practical Reason, Kant introduces the postulate of the immortality of the soul, arguing that it is a necessary condition of »continuous and unending progress from lower to higher stages of moral perfection«. Yet, if the soul is immortal, it is -upon the death of the body - no longer a denizen of the world of space and time; and if the soul is no longer under the temporal condition, how are we to understand »continuous and unending progress«? Is it not that Kant actually needs to postulate the immortality of the body, rather then the immortality of the soul? - A body which exists and changes in time, yet approaches its end, its death, in »endless« asymptotic movement. The paper deals with this and other paradoxes of the Kantian theory of the postulates - in relation to the moral law.In his Critique of Practical Reason, Kant introduces the postulate of the immortality of the soul, arguing that it is a necessary condition of »continuous and unending progress from lower to higher stages of moral perfection«. Yet, if the soul is immortal, it is -upon the death of the body - no longer a denizen of the world of space and time; and if the soul is no longer under the temporal condition, how are we to understand »continuous and unending progress«? Is it not that Kant actually needs to postulate the immortality of the body, rather then the immortality of the soul? - A body which exists and changes in time, yet approaches its end, its death, in »endless« asymptotic movement. The paper deals with this and other paradoxes of the Kantian theory of the postulates - in relation to the moral law

Peti pogoj: k filozofiji Alaina Badiouja

In his general conception of philosophy, Alain Badiou insists on two issues: the first concerns the four conditions of philosophy (mathematics, politics, art and love), whereas the second refers to the principle according to which philosophy has to pull itself away from the immediate grip of its conditions, while nevertheless remaining within their field. The author analyses various aspects of this last principle (calling it “the fifth condition”), within Badiou’s philosophy itself as well as in its confrontation with some other currents of contemporary thought. Starting from Badiou’s concepts of excess, of the One and of multiple, she brings forward the question of representation and its different conceptions.V svoji splošni koncepciji filozofije Alain Badiou izpostavi dvoje: štiri pogoje filozofije (matematika, politika, umetnost in ljubezen) in pa načelo, po katerem se mora filozofija odvijati v določenem odmiku od lastnih pogojev. Drugače rečeno, filozofija se mora umakniti neposrednemu prijemu svojih pogojev, pri tem pa vseeno ostati znotraj njihovega polja. Avtorica analizira različne vidike tega zadnjega načela, ki ga imenuje »peti pogoj«, tako znotraj same Badioujeve misli, kot v njenem soočenju z nekaterimi drugimi, čeprav sorodnimi miselnimi tokovi. Izhajajoč iz Badioujevih pojmov presežka, Enega in mnoštva v ospredje postavi vprašanje reprezentacije in različne koncepcije le-te

La logique de l'apparence

The paper deals with the Kantian theory of transcendental ideas, developed in the Critique of Pure reason. In the first part, it elaborates the notion of »illusion« (das Scheiri), pointing out that the »illusion« (or the »apparition«) does not refer to (false) representation of a given object. The fundamental point of the transcendental illusion is that there is no object to be (falsely or correctly) represented, we are deceived by the sheer existence of this »illusion« and not by its »content«, e.i. by what it »represents«. The second part of the paper discusses the four »figures of nothing« that Kant elaborates in the last part of the Analytic and shows the relevance of this topic for the developments in the Dialectic. The third part focuses on the »Paralogism of personality« and tries to discern in it the basic structural function of the transcendental ideas in general. The Paralogism in question is also discussed in relation to Lacanian theory of »ego-ideal«.The paper deals with the Kantian theory of transcendental ideas, developed in the Critique of Pure reason. In the first part, it elaborates the notion of »illusion« (das Scheiri), pointing out that the »illusion« (or the »apparition«) does not refer to (false) representation of a given object. The fundamental point of the transcendental illusion is that there is no object to be (falsely or correctly) represented, we are deceived by the sheer existence of this »illusion« and not by its »content«, e.i. by what it »represents«. The second part of the paper discusses the four »figures of nothing« that Kant elaborates in the last part of the Analytic and shows the relevance of this topic for the developments in the Dialectic. The third part focuses on the »Paralogism of personality« and tries to discern in it the basic structural function of the transcendental ideas in general. The Paralogism in question is also discussed in relation to Lacanian theory of »ego-ideal«

Cogito ergo es

Der Beitrag befaßt sich mit der Problematik des cogito, wie sie innerhalb des Deutschen Idealismus entwickelt wurde, wobei er sich vor allem auf Kants »transzendentale Einheit der Apperzeption« und auf Hegels »Selbstbewußtsein« konzertriert. Die Interpretation dieser Problematik stützt sich dabei auf Lacans Seminar Logik des Phantasmas und gehta darauf hinaus, den Unterschied zwischen dem Selbstbewußtsein und der Selbsttransparenz zu bestimmen. In diesem Kontext wird nachgewiesen, daß gerade die Tatsache, daß das Ich sich selbst nicht transparent ist, die Basis des Selbstbewußtseins bildet. Daran schließt der Beitrag die Unterscheidung zwischen dem »normalen Subjekt« und dem »Subjekt des Unbewußten« an.Avtorica razvija problematiko cogita, in sicer predvsem v razmerju do oblike, ki jo je ta problematika dobila v nemški klasični filozofiji, torej v Kantovi »transcendentalni enotnosti apercepcije« ter v Heglovem »samozavedanju«. Pri tem navezuje svojo interpretacijo na Lacanov seminar Logika fantazme. Osnovni motiv teksta je razlikovanje med samozavedanjem in samorazvidnostjo. V tem kontekstu avtorica pokaže, kako je prav neka neprosojnost jaza samemu sebi osnova samozavedanja. Na to potem naveže interpretacijo razlikovanja med »normalnim subjektom« in »subjektom nezavednega«

Realizm w psychoanalizie

Many recent philosophical discussions have been marked by the rather stunning re-launching of the question of realism, triggered by Quentin Meillassoux‟s book After finitude (Après la finitude, 2006), and followed by a wider, albeit less homogeneous, movement named „speculative realism‟. This paper raises the question of whether the conceptual field of Lacanian psychoanalysis is concerned with this debate, and if so how. The central argument scrutinizes the status of the „real‟ in science, and its implications for psychoanalysis in view of the Lacanian identification of the subject of the unconscious with the subject of (Galilean) science. Taking seriously Lacan‟s claim that „If I am anything, it is clear that I‟m not a nominalist‟, the present paper aims at sketching out a psychoanalytic version of realism.Wiele spośród ostatnich dyskusji filozoficznych naznaczył, w taki czy inny sposób, oszałamiający pod niejednym względem powrót do problematyki realizmu, zainicjowany przez książkę Quentina Meillassoux Après la finitude (2006) i kontynuowany przez szerszy, choć niejednolity ruch „spekulatywnego realizmu”. Artykuł podnosi kwestię czy ta debata dotyka w jakiś sposób, a jeśli tak to w jaki, konceptualnego pola psychoanalizy lacanowskiej. Główne rozważania dotyczą statusu "realności" w nauce i jej znaczenia dla psychoanalizy w świetle lacanowskiego utożsamienia podmiotu nieświadomości z podmiotem (galilejskiej) nauki. Poważnie traktując słowa Lacana, "Jasne jest w każdym razie, że nie jestem nominalistą", artykuł próbuje zarysować psychoanalityczną wersję realizmu

Das Unheimliche Kantove teorije prava

Der Beitrag interpretiert zuerst Kants Theorie des urspünglichen Gesellschaftsvertrags, davon ausgehend, daß Kant durch die Zweideutigkeit seines Gebrauchs des Naturbegriffs den Trennpunkt Natur/Gesellschaft problematisiert. Der gesellschaftliche, bürgerliche Zustand ist keineswegs ein bloßer Bruch mit der Natur, bei Kant wird vielmehr die Natur selbst als innere Bedingung zur Herstellung des bürgerlichen Zustandes und aller seiner weiteren Entwicklung verstanden. In der Fortsetzung befasst sich der Beitrag dann mit einer Anmerkung aus der Metaphysik der Sitten, in der Kant den Unterschied zwischen dem Mord des Monarchen und seiner formellen Hinrichtung behandelt. Der Beitrag versucht aufzuhellen, warum diese Hinrichtung von Kant mit äußerstem Schrecken betrachet wird und für ihn etwas Unanhembares und völlig Unvorstellbares bleibt.Tekst najprej poda interpretacijo Kantove teorije prvotnega dogovora, izvorne družbene pogodbe. Jedro argumentacije je v tem, da Kant z dvoumnostjo, s katero uporablja pojem narave, problematizira samo ločnico narava/družba oziroma »naravno stanje«/»družbeno stanje«. Družbeno, civilno stanje ne pomeni le preloma z naravo, temveč na neki točki Kantu nastopi narava sama kot tista, ki je notranji pogoj tako vzpostavitve civilnega stanja, kot njegovega nadaljnega razvoja. Glavno osišče teksta pa je interpretacija neke opombe iz Die Metaphysik der Sitten, kjer Kant govori o razliki med umorom monarha in njegovo formalno usmrtitvijo. Slednja mu nastopa kot nekaj povsem nezaslišanega in interpretacija poskuša osvetliti razloge, zaradi katerih lahko Kant govori o omenjenem dejanju zgolj s skrajno grozo, kot o nečem povsem nezamišlji-vem